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Recent Cases
AGENCY-PimESUMTION TkEREOF AIusiNG FIRomI OWNERSnIP OF MOTOR
VEmcLE AND EMpLovmINr OF D uvE-Plaintiffs brought suit against
defendant for injuries they received when struck by a vehicle owned
by defendant, but driven by one of his employees. Testimony of the
employee-driver was to the effect that he had completed a special
mission for the defendant and was at the time of the accident driving
the defendant's truck on an errand of his own. The lower court
directed a verdict in favor of the defendant on the ground that there
was insufficient evidence that the employee-driver was within the
scope of his employment and the plaintiffs appealed. The Court of
Appeals of Kentucky affirmed the decision, holding that the driver
was not acting in behalf of the employer when the accident occured,
and that there was no implied authority or consent on the part of the
defendant which could be construed to sanction the employee's use
of the truck at that time. Higgins v. Deskins, 268 S.W. 2d 108 (Ky.
1953).
The court recognized the general rule that the plaintiff has the
burden of proving both the employment of the driver and his opera-
tion of the vehicle within the scope of his agency at the time of the
accident. The court also recited the rule that ". . . proof of ownership,
coupled with evidence of employment, creates a presumption of re-
sponsible agency which requires the defendant to take up the burden
of evidence and rebut the presumption. ....-t
The reasoning behind the creation of such a presumption to aid the
plaintiff is found in the case of Webb v. Dixie-Ohio Express Company,2
where the court said:
Because it is often impossible for the plaintiff to prove the agency of
the operator, it is deemed desirable socially that the burden of intro-
ducing evidence on non-agency should be placed upon the defendant
in whose peculiar knowledge rests the material evidence essential to a
determination of this fact.3
The presumption is iebuttable and may be overcome by evidence
to the contrary which is clear, convincing, conclusive and unimpeach-
able.4 The court, in the principal case, inferred that this presumption
'Higgins v. Deskins, 263 S.W. 2d 108, 110 (Ky. 1953).
2 291 Ky. 692, 165 S.W. 2d 539 (1942).
OId. at 694, 165 S.W. 2d at 540.
'Ashland Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Ellison, 252 Ky. 172, 66 S.W. 2d 52
(1934).
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was raised in favor of the plaintiff but held that it had been sufficiently
overcome by the defendant's evidence.
This presumption was first recognized by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals in Wood v. Indianapolis Abattoir Company of Kentucky5
However, the rule stated in that case, relating to the requirements for
raising the presumption, placed upon the plaintiff not only the burden
of proving ownership and general employment, but also "... . that the
employe was driving the automobile with authority, express or implied,
of the owner . .."0 The court considered and rejected the rule as
stated in the principal case which requires only proof of ownership
coupled with evidence of general employment. Thus, there seem to
be inconsistent statements in the Kentucky cases concerning the re-
quirements for raising this presumption.7
Although such an inconsistency at first glance may seem to be
insignificant, it will be well to remember the reasoning behind the
adoption of this presumption. The key to the plaintiff's case is the
master-servant relationship existing between the employer-owner and
the driver; however, this key will most likely be in the possession of
the employer-owner since it is usually within his knowledge whether
or not the driver was within the scope of employment when the ac-
cident occurred. Thus, the courts have established a rule which places
the burden of going forward with the evidence upon the employer-
owner when the plaintiff has established certain facts. The burden it
would seem is not too great, for all the employer-owner need do is
rebut the presumption of agency, and if in fact there was no agency,
it would seem he is the party who would, in most instances, be best
able to so prove. To leave the task of establishing such agency upon
the plaintiff would in some cases burden him with an almost impossible
task. Therefore, the end result of the rule seems desirable.
The question, then, in order to raise the presumption, is whether
the plaintiff should be required to prove ownership coupled with
evidence of employment as is required in the principal case, or
whether he should be required to go further and prove that the agent
was driving the automobile with the authority of the owner, as was
178 Ky. 188, 198 S.W. 782 (1917).0Id. at 191, 198 S.W. at 733.
'Following Wood v. Indianapolis Abattoir Co. of Kentucky: Galloway Motor
Co. v. Huffman's Adm'r, 281 Ky. 841, 137 S.W. 2d 879 (1940); Ashland Coca
Cola Bottling Co. v. Ellison, 252 Ky. 172, 66 S.W. 2d 52 (1933); Dennes v.
Jefferson Meat Market, 228 Ky. 164, 14 S.W. 2d 408 (1929); Mullen and Haynes
Co. v. Crisp, 207 Ky. 31, 268 S.W. 576 (1925). Following Higgins v. Deskins:
Hickman v. Strunk, 303 Ky. 397, 197 S.W. 2d 442 (1946); Webb v. Dixie-Ohio
Express Co. 291 Ky. 682, 165 S.W. 2d 539 (1942); Rawlings v. Clay Motor Co.,
287 Ky. 604, 154 S.W. 2d 711 (1941); Home Laundry Co. v. Cook, 277 Ky. 8,
125 S.W. 2d 763 (1939).
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required in the Wood case." It would seem that the rule of the prin-
cipal case should be uniformly adopted in Kentucky, and the more
recent Kentucky decisions are moving in that direction. 9 The primary
reason for having such a rule is that the element of agency is a matter
within the knowledge of the employer-owner. It is also within his
knowledge as to whether or not the employee had authority to drive
the automobile. The latter as well as the former may be very difficult
to prove on the part of the plaintiff especially if he is injured by an
employee who does not have the duty generally under the terms of
his employment to drive the automobile. The principal case is a good
example of this because there the employee did not have the duty
generally under the terms of his employment to drive the automobile.
Therefore, why should the plaintiff be burdened with having to estab-
lish an additional fact, which is in some cases impossible for him to do,
so as to raise a presumption in his favor, which the defendant can
rebut as easily without the additional fact as with it?
Not only do the Kentucky decisions fail to follow a uniform line
with regard to the requirements for establishing the presumption in
question, but also the requirements as to raising the presumption vary
throughout the nation. 10 Some jurisdictions hold that ownership of the
vehicle is prima facie proof that the driver of the car was acting
within the scope of the owner's business," while some are in accord
with the principal case,12 and others follow the Wood case.'8
Thus, a rather confusing picture is presented with several theories
advanced concerning the requirements for raising the presumption of
agency in favor of the plaintiff. The rule of the principal case requir-
ing the plaintiff to prove only ownership and general employment
seems to be the best rule, as it requires the plaintiff to prove facts
which are reasonable under the circumstances and then places the
burden upon the defendant to go forward and rebut the presumption
raised from proof of such facts. The defendant's position, it would
seem, allows him to accomplish this task. It is submitted that the rule
of the principal case presents a better balance of the duties and obliga-
tions of the parties concerned and a clearer road to justice.
GEORGE D. ScmuDER
8Supra note 5.
"Supra note 7.
"'HtrDDY oN ATrroMoBams sees. 794-95 (8th ed. 1927).
Graves v. Utica Candy Co., 209 App. Div. 193, 204 N.Y. Supp. 682 (1924).
= d'Aleria v. Shirey, 286 Fed. 523 (C.C.A., 9th Cir. 1923).
'"White Oak Coal Co. v. Rivoux, 88 Ohio St. 18, 102 N.E. 302 (1913).
Some cases hold that such evidence does not p resent a prima facie case of liability,
but that the plaintiff must show affirmatively, at the particular occasion under
consideration, the driver was acting for his employer within the scope of employ-
ment. Washburn v. R. F. Owens Co., 252 Mass. 47, 147 N.E. 564 (1925).
